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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATB OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 18173

DAVID RILEY JACOB,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with Aggravated Arson, a
second-degree felony, under Utah Code Ann.,

s

76-6-103 (1953),

as amended, as the result of a fire in an apartment building
on September 21, 1979.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On December 2fi, 1979, appellant was found competent
to stand trial in the Third Judicial District Court, the
Honorable Dean E. Conder presiding.

Notice of intent to rely

on the defense of insanity was filed by appellant on January
31, 1980.

The facts of this case were entered by stipulation

on April 15, 1980.

Appellant was found not guilty by reason

of insanity before the Honorable Christine M. Durham, sitting
withoui a jury, on that date.

Appellant was committed to the

Utah State Hospital pending psychiatric examination to
determine whether his sanity had been restored under Utah Code
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Ann.,

s

76-24-15 (1953), as amended, repealed July 1, 1980.

A

hearing was held on July 18, 1980 to determine whether
appellant's sanity had been restored.

On

January:30, 1981 the

Honorable Christine M. Durham entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law that appellant suffered from chronic
paranoid schizophrenia that could be controlled by medication.
The court found that appellant's condition under such
medication met the test of sanity under S 76-24-15.

Appellant

was, therefore, ordered released under the supervision of
Adult Probation and Parole on the specific condition that he
be maintained on medication.

Both Adult Probation and the

Utah State Hospital declined to administer such a program due
to a lack of statutory authority.
On June 2, 1981, appellant _requested a hearing
pursuant to S 77-24-16 to determine if his sanity had been
restored.

That hearing was held on July 22, 1981.

The court

issued a memorandum decision on August 7, 1981 vacating the
previous order of conditional release.

The court found that

appellant had not recoverea from his mental illness within the
meaning of the Utah statutes and ordered that he be remanded
to the custody of the Utah State Hospital.I

!Although it is not entirely clear, the court's
order ~f August 7, 1981 appears to be based on s 77-14-5.
wording of the order is consistent with that statute.
-2-
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The

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the order of the court below that appellant be

~

co~fined

to the

Utah State Hospital until such time as he has recovered from
his mental illness and denying appellant's request that he be
released pursuant to former Utah Code Ann., s 77-24-16 (1953),
as amended, repealed July 1, 1980.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 21, 1979, a fire broke out on the third
floor of an apartment building at 1310 East 200 South in Salt
Lake City (R. 35).

Appellant was a resident of the building

and admitted to investigators at the scene that he had started
the fire with crumpled newspaper in his own and another room
(R. 36).

The reason appellant gave for starting the fires

what that he wanted to kill himself (R. 36).

At the time

appellant was interviewed, on the day after the fire, his
.jf,

thought processes were disrupted (R. 36, 39-50).
Over a period of ten years prior to the fire,
appellant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, a chronic
mental disease (R. 36).

Dr. Breck LeBegue interviewed

appellant shortly after the fire and concluded that appellant
was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct but
lacked, a substantial capacity to conform to the requirements
of law (R. 37).

Dr. Lewis G. Moench also examined appellant,

reaching the same conclusion (R. 37).
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Paranoid schizophrenia is caused by a genetic bio-

.

chemical defect in the neurotransmitters of the brain (R.
~

137).

~

There is no cure for this mental disorder,;but it may

be controlled with neuroleptic drugs (R. 137, 138).

A patient

who discontinues use of the drug prescribed will eventually
begin to re-exhibit

syrnp~oms

behavior (R. 137).

The dosage must be closely monitored

of paranoid schizophrenic.

because a patient's needs change with changing circumstances
(R. 141).

Dosages may need to be increased, for example, when

the patient is exposed to stressful

~ituations

(R. 141).

Appellant has been treated with neuroleptic drugs
since he was taken into custody (R. 139, 193, 217-218).

The

doctor's orders are for 1/2-cc. of prolyxin every two weeks,
but appellant also may request extra medication if he feels it
is necessary7 i.e., if there are symptoms causing "troubles"
(R. 194).

While taking this drug, appellant has improved to

the best extent possible.

No symptoms of the mental disorder

were manifested by appellant at the time of the hearing (R.
147, 210).

According to nr. Susan Miron, appellant possessed

the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and
to conform his conduct to the law at that time (R. 214-215).
Appellant has received medication for his illness on
previous occasions (R. 204).

Each time he has been released

in the- past, appellant discontinued use of the drug and became
overtly psychotic (R. 139, 204, 219).

Once he feels well,
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appellant no longer recognizes the need for treatment and
stops taking medication (R. 140).

This is a manifestation

that is common to both normal patients with other=diseases and
patients with schizophrenia.

A schizophrenic, however, lacks

the insight to understand the nature of the disease and the
need to continue treatment (R. 140).
Among the manifestations of appellant's illness when
not under medication were characteristics such as wanting to
carve up women's bodies, transvestism, arson and shooting at
police officers (R. 141).

According to Dr. LeBegue, these

symptoms would be continually displayed by appellant if he
were not receiving medication (R. 142).

Appellant is a threat

to himself and others when he is delusional {R. 146).

It was

the personal opinion of Dr. van Austin that appellant would
not continue to take the drugs prescribed if he were released
( R. 20 5) •

..~

There is not currently in existence a program that

could assure appellant would continue treatment (R. 158).
Both Adult Probation and Parole and the Utah State Hospital
have declined to supervise a conditional release program {R.
114).

Appellant would need to visit a mental therapist every

two weeks, but clinics have no authority to force patients to
keep appointments (R. 143, 158).

There is no reliable way to

test a· patient• s blood to determine that he is taking his
medication because traces of these drugs remain in the body
-5-
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long after the patient has ceased taking them (R. 159).
Appellant claims, however, that he would continue treatment if
released.

When he stopped taking the drugs in

th~

past, it

was because he was not taking the proper drug and it produced
side effects.

Appellant believes he is taking the proper drug

now (R. 219).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED
RATHER THAN S 77-24-16.

§

77-14-5

Appellant claims that the application of Utah Code
Ann.,§ 77-14-5 (1980) as the basis of the trial court's
decision on August 7, 1981 was a violation of the
constitutional provisions against ex post facto laws.

This

claim is based on the fact that when appellant committed the
act of arson and pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity,
another statute was in effect.

Generally, however, statutes

are not ex post facto merely because they operate on events
antecedent to their effective dates.
386, 390 (1798).

Calder v. Bull, 3

u.s.

It is the effect that the statute will have

that determines its validity with respect to ex post facto
inhibitions.
denied, 446

State v. Coleman, 605 P.2d 1000, 1010, cert.

u.s.

970, reh. denied, 448

u.s.

914 (Mont. 1979).

That etfect must be to materially affect some substantial
right of the defendant.

Id. at 1011.

A defendant does not

-~
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have a right to the application of the law in force at the
time of the crime where the change is procedural and does not
deprjve him of a substantial right.

Id.

Traditionally, courts have noted that ex post facto
laws are stimulated by "ambition, or personal resentment and
vindictive malice."

They are statutes that make an act a

crime that was innocent ·when done, increase the punishment for
a crime after its commission or deprive an accused of a
defense available at the time when the act was committed.
at 1010.

Id.

Thus, the ex post facto prohibition applies only to

penal statutes.

Estate of Hofferber;

Cal. 3d 161, 616 P.2d 836, 849 (1980).
v. United States, 225

u.s.

1~7

Cal. Rptr. 854, 28

See also:

Johannessen

227 (1912).

In this case, the application of S 77-14-5 to
appellant does not fit within the definition of an ex post
facto law.

The statute does not make something criminal that

was not, it does not eliminate a defense, nor does it increase
the punishment for a crime.

The confinement of a person found

not guilty by reason of insanity or mental illness is not for
the purpose of punishment.

To say that it is for punishment

purposes is to say that a court may punish a defendant who has
been found not guilty under other defenses such as selfdefense or justification.
by

rea~on

Rather, the verdict of not guilty

of insanity points out the need for a subsequent

determination of the actor's mental condition, not for
punishment purposes, but for treatment purposes and to protect
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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society and/or the actor from potential harm.
State, 210 Ga. 52, 77 S.E.2d 511 (1953).
§

Bailey v.

Therefore,

77-14-5 is not penal in nature although it

appe~rs

within

the criminal code and is triggered by the outcome of a
criminal proceeding.

The statute does not focus on the act

committed by appellant, but on the presence of mental illness
as demonstrated at the time of the hearing, not at the time of
the act.

It is not a crime to be mentally ill.

Indeed, no

state would likely attempt to make mental illness a crime.
"[A] state might [however] determine that the general health
and welfare require that the victims of these
afflictions be dealt with by compulsory treatment."
v. California, 370

u.s.

fi60 (1962).

Robinson

Other courts have

characterized commitment proceedings following a finding of
not guilty by reason of insanity as non-criminal, and
therefore not ex post facto.

See, e.g., Bailey, supra: Ex

parte:!iayback, 209 Cal. 480, 288 P. 769, 771 (1930): Ex parte
Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 P. 492 (1912).
Because the purpose of commitment to a mental
facility after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity
is not to punish the actor,
statute.

s

77-14-5 is not a criminal

Being a non-criminal statute, its application to

appellant was not ex post facto.

Therefore,

~

77-14-5 was

properiy applied in this case.

-8-
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POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED
THAT APPELLANT HAD NOT RECOVERED FROM HIS
MENTAL ILLNESS.
A.

THE ISSUE IS NOT WHETHER THE COURT
PROPERLY DEFINED SANITY, BUT WHETHER
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT
APPELLANT HAD NOT RECOVERED FROM HIS
MENTAL ILLNESS.

Appellant claims that the District Court's
incorporation of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law
dated January 30, 1981 into its order of August 7, 1981 caused
the latter to be based on an improper definition of sanity.
Had the proper definition of sanity been utilized, appellant
would have been released from the Utah State Hospital.
According to appellant, the proper definition of sanity is the
opposite of the insanity defense.

That is, that appellant

have the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of law
(see Appellant's Brief, Points II and III).
This appeal, however, is not based on the hearing of
July 18, 1980 or the order conditionally releasing appellant
dated January 30, 1981.

That hearing and order were pursuant

to s 77-24-16 and were for the purpose of determining if
appellant had been restored to sanity.

This appeal is based

on the hearing of July 22, 1981 and the order of August 7,
1981 wttich were based on

s

77-14-5.

That statute provides

-9-
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as follows:
(2) A defendant committed to the Utah
State Hospital pursuant to subsection (1)
may apply, • • • to the district court of
the county from which he was committed, ·
for an order of release on the grounds
that he has recovered from his mental
illness • • • •
Utah Code Ann., S 77-14-5 (1953), as amended.

The

determination made at the July, 1981 hearing and 0ffected by
the order of August 7, then, was whether appellant had
recovered from his mental illness.

The issue on appeal,

therefore, is not whether the court applied the proper
definition of sanity, but it is whether the court properly
determined that appellant had not recovered from his mental
illness.
issue.

Appellant's argument to the contrary confuses the
To claim that S 77-14-5 was wrongfully applied in the

order from which he appeals and then to claim that it was not
actually applied, but that an improper interpretation of
§

77-24-16 was applied, is inconsistent.

Appellant appears to

argue that the court may have applied both statutes in the
order dated August 7, 1981 while the wording of the order is
consistent only with s 77-14-s.2

2The order states: "[T]his court cannot find that
the defendant has recovered from his mental illness within the
meaning of the ~tah statutes • • • • " (R. 115) (emphasis
added)~

-10-
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The proper procedure for seeking review of a
perceived defect in the 1980 hearing and subseque~t order
would have been to take an appeal from that order-pursuant to
the provisions in Utah Code Ann.,
(1953), as amended.
that order.

s

77-35-2n(d)(l) and (j)

Appellant, however, did not appeal from

Instead, appellant demonstrated acquiescence by

waiting nearly a full year and requesting a new hearing not
based upon the original hearing, but to determine if appellant
had been restored to sanity as of the date of the new hearing.
Appellant may not now claim error based on the hearing of July
18, 1980 or the court's subsequent order.
B.

THE COURT APPLIED THE PROPER STANDARD
IN DETERMINING THAT APPELLANT HAD NOT
RECOVERED FROM HIS MENTAL ILLNESS.

The Utah code requires that a person found not
guilty by reason of insanity must be committed to the state
hospital until such time as he has recovered from his mental
illness, Utah Code Ann.,

~

77-14-5 (1953), as amended.

There

are no standards listed in that statute for determining
whether a person has recovered from his mental illness.
However, the general rules of statutory construction require
that this Court construe statutory language in a way that
comports with constitutional restraints while carrying out the
purpos€ of the law.

This Court said in Greaves v. State,

Utah, 528 P.2d 805, 807 (1974) that:
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In determining whether the statute carries
out [its] purpose, it should not be given
any tortured or strained application to
conjectured or hypothetical situations,
but should be understood and applied in -a
fair, realistic and practical manner to·
the situation confronted, and in the
awareness that all of the law is not
stated in one sentence or one paragraph,
but a statute is to be construed and
applied in relation to other requirements
of the law.
Thus, statutes must be construed in a manner that is sensible
and gives practical effect to their provisions.

Id.

To

determine the meaning of S 77-14-5, then, this Court must
examine the purposes behind the section in context with other
provisions of the law while giving fair import to its terms so
as to effect those purposes.
The fair import of the phrase "recovered from his
mental illness" in

~

77-14-5 is that an appellant must be free

from mental illness or insanity and, therefore, sane.

It

follows that a person who is dangerous to himself or others as
a result of mental illness is not recovered from his mental
illness.

A determination that a person remains dangerous to

himself or others, then, is a determination that he has not
recovered from his mental illness.
Appellant asserts that the fair import of the
statute is the requirement that a person have the capacity to
t

recognize the difference between right and wrong and to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law in order to be
-12-
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recovered from mental illness.

This is not the same as no

longer being dangerous according to appellant.

Appellant

suggests that clearly a person who has that capaci_ty is not
dangerous as a result of his mental illness.

Appellant

further contends that a mere risk of future danger is not
sufficient to establish that a person has not recovered from
his mental illness or that he is dangerous and cannot conform
his actions to law and, therefore, he may not be confined
under S 7 7-14- 5 •
To read S 77-14-5 in a manner that precludes the

court from considering factors other than whether the
appellant knows the difference between right and wrong or can
conform himself to the requirements of law is to ignore the
purposes behind the statute.

One of the purposes behind the

statute is to provide treatment for persons who have
demonstrated a need for treatment by committing an illegal
act.

A second goal is to protect such a person from himself

or to protect society from acts harmful to others.
with these goals is a reading of

~

Consistent

77-14-5 that allows the

trial court to consider whether appellant may become violent
in the future as a result of his mental illness, even though
he may have the capacity to know the difference between right
and wrong and to conform his actions to law at that point in
time. ·
Other courts have considered these factors in
deciding whether to maintain a person such as appellant in
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

custody.

In Clark v. State, 151 Ga. App. 853, 261 S.E.2d 764

(1979), Clark was found not guilty of murder by reason of
.,,

insanity.

He was committed to a state hospital p9rsuant to

that determination and applied for release on the grounds that
he was not mentally ill because he did not meet the standards
for involuntary commitment.

Those standards were that a

person must present a substantial risk of danger to himself or
others manifested by recent acts or threats.

In holding that

Clark met the standard the court took into account the fact
that persons with schizophrenia are subject to a relapse if
they discontinue use of prescribed medication and that they
are frequently reluctant to take medication.

The court also

considered relevant the fact that Clark had discontinued
taking medication in the past and that he had refused
medication only two weeks prior to the hearing.
Similarly, the court in State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203,
287 A.2d 715, 722 (1972) said:

•

It would depart from the justification for
the recognition of insanity as a defense
to view the psychotic explosion in
isolation from the underlying illness. To
do so would fail to protect the citizens
from further acute episodes. The
protection must be equal to the risk of
further violence. An offender is not
"restored to reason" unless he is so freed
of the underlying illness that his
"reason" can be expected to prevail.
Hence the underlying or latent personality
disorder, and not merely the psychotic
episode which emerged from it, is the
-14-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

relevant illness, and the statutory
requirement for restoration to reason as a
pre-condition for release from custody is
not met so long as that underlying illness
continues.
In this case, appellant's past history of release,
discontinuation of drugs and then relapse is a relevant factor
to his release.

Appellant has demonstrated that he is

unwilling and/or unable to conform his behavior to the
requirements of law when he is not under medication.

He has

demonstrated at no time in the past the ability to maintain a
treatment program to control his behavior.

Appellant's

previous behavior cannot be separated from his underlying
illness so as to say that when a period of violence has been
ended by treatment, so too has the mental illness disappeared.
This is not the case; appellant will in all likelihood never
be rid of that underlying illness or its manifestations

characterized by unwillingness to continue treatment and low
stress·~ tolerance.

Because that underlying illness remains,

appellant remains mentally ill and dangerous although he
exhibits no symptoms at the present time.
Although this is a case of first impression in Utah,
other courts have considered whether a person need only meet
the test suggested by appellant in this case in order to be
released.
Rptr.

~25

In People v. Mallory, 254 Cal. App. 2d 151, 61 Cal.
{2d Dist. 1967), the appellant claimed the refusal
-15-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the trial court to apply the M'Naughten test3 to
determine if his sanity had been restored was error because
the J'Naughten test was used in rendering the verqict of not
guilty by reason of insanity.

The appellate court, in

determining that M'Naughten was not the proper standard, said:
it is apparent • • • that the question is
not merely wh~tner the defendant has
recovered from 'the state of insanity he
was in when he committed the criminal act,
that is, the mental state of not knowing
right from wrong, but the question is
whether he has fully recovered his sanity.
Id. at 828.

;

Thus the court appears to state that a person may

be able to distinguish between right··and wrong but still
remain insane for purposes of release.

Similarly, in People

v. Giles, 192 Colo. 240, 557 P.2d 408, 411 (1976), the
Colorado court said that:
Both the "right and wrong" and
"irresistible impulse" tests of legal
insanity refer to the defendant's mental
condition at the time the alleged crime
was committed. Those tests are standards
to aid in determining accountability for
acts which constitute crimes when done by
one who is of sound mind. A leading
authority has stated that the issue to be
determined at that time is essentially a
moral one--whether the defendant was

3The M'Naughten test is defined in LaFave and
Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law at p. 275: The accused
suffers from a defect of reason, from a disease of the mind
such that he does not know the nature and quality of his act
or tha~ the act was wrong.
-lf)-
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suff~ciently aware of the wrongful nature
of his act and adequatley in control of
his impulses to be held accountable for
that act. J. Macdonald, Psychiatry and:
the Criminal 62 (3d ed. 1976).

Even though the statutory standard for the
defense of insanity concerns itself solely
with the defendant's mental state when the
allegedly criminal conduct occurrea, the
defendant argues that he was denied due
process by the trial court's refusal to
apply that standard to govern his
application for release more than four
years after the time to which that
standard refers. The statutory test for
release following commitment after a
successful insanity defense, however,
concerns itself with the defendant's
mental state at the time he seeks release.
Its purpose is to determine whether a
person who previously claimed he was
criminally insane, and therefore not
accountable for actions which otherwise
would be crimes, should be set free.
In the instant case it is also not relevant to apply
the standard used at the time appellant was found not guilty
by reason of insanity.

The Court is no longer concerned with

the sa~ie issues as were present at that time.

What is

important now is whether a person who has been found mentally
ill ano therefore not responsible for his criminal actions may
now be released.

The policy issue to be considered is not

culpability for past crime but potential for future aberrant
behavior as a result of continuing mental illness. The only
reasonable way to determine that potential is to take into
consideration all of those factors that remain present that
contributed to such behavior in the past ana that indicate
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the presence of mental illness.

These factors include:

(1)

the disease appellant suffers from is biocheical and cannot be
cured, (2) one manifestation of the disease is

to~refuse

or

discontinue treatment, (3) appellant has discontinued
treatment in the past, (4) there is no statutory power to
force appellant to continue treatment once he is released, and
(5) environmental factors such as stress may increase the
dosage of prolyxin necessary to maintain appellant and such
factors are not easily controlled outside a structured
setting.
C.

THE LEGISLATURE HAS RECENTLY INDICATED
THAT A PERSON SUCH AS APPELLANT DOES
NOT FIT THE STANDARD OF HAVING
RECOVERED FROM HIS MENTAL ILLNESS.

Utah Code Ann., S 77-14-5 was recently amended by
the legislature.

That section now reads:

(1) When a jury renders a verdict of "not
guilty by reason of insanity", the court
shall then conduct a hearing within five
days to determine if the defendant is
presently mentally ill • • • •
(2) After the hearing and upon
consideration of the record, if the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant is still mentally ill
and because of that mental illness
presents a substantial danger to himself
or others, the court shall order him
committed to the Utah state hospital. The
defendant shall not be released from
confinement therein until the court which
comitted [sic] the defendant shall, after
hearing, find that the defendant has
recovered from his mental illness • • • •
-18-
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For purposes of this section,a person
affected with a mental illness which is in
remission as a result of menication and
hospitalization shall remain committed to
the Utah State Hospital if it can be
determined within reasonable medical
probability that without continued
medication and hospitalization the
defendant's mental illness will reoccur,
thereby making the person a substantial
danger to himself or others.

•

1983 Utah laws, H.B. No. ·225; Utah Code Ann., S
(1983).

77-14-~

Under this section, appellant clearly would not be

eligible for release.

This section, coupled with the fact

that no statutory guidelines existed previously for release of
persons such as appellant, indicates.that the legislature
intended that appellant and others like him would not be
released under the old

s

77-14-5.

Clearly, the legislature

intended that appellant's dangerousness or potential for
danger should be considered when determining if he had
recovered from his mental illness under S 77-14-5 along with
the fact that he must be maintained on medication.
POINT III
SECTION 77-14-5 IS CONSTITUTIONAL BOTH ON
ITS FACE AND AS APPLIED TO APPELLANT.
A.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTIONS
77-24-15 and 77-24-16 NEED NOT BE
CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.

Appellant argues that former
S 76-24-16 are void for vagueness.4

§

76-24-15 and

This argument is

4see Appellant's Brief, Point III, p. 16 and Point
II, p. 11.
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based on the fact that no definition of sanity or standards
for restoration to sanity are supplied within the statute.
Because no definitions or standards are

supplied,~appellant

contends that the judge was free to apply the statute in an
arbitrary and discriminatory manner.

No case law is cited

supporting this theory or demonstrating that similarly
situated persons have been released in this state.
Furthermore, these statutes were not applied to appellant in
the hearing and order from which he appeals.

As argued above,

the statute applied in the hearing and order from which
appellant appeals was

~

77-14-5.

An

argument that S 76-24-15

and S 76-24-16 are void for vagueness, then, is not relevant.
Aside from the fact that these statutes are irrelevant is the
fact that they have been repealed.

Appellant asks this Court

to declare unconstitutional statutes that have been repealed
and no longer carry any force.
fut

This is an exercise in

il~~Y·

B.

SECTION 77-14-5 IS NOT VOID FOR VAGUENESS.

The general and well established rule is that
statutes are presumed to be valid and should not be declared
unconstitutional by a reviewing court if they may be found
constitutional on any reasonable basis.

Unless a statute is

found to be unconstitutionally vague beyond a reasonable
doubt, it will be upheld.

Greaves v. State, Utah, 528 P.2d

805, 806 (1974)1 State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561
( 19 73) •

In fact , the:
-20-
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prohibition against excessive vagueness
does not invalidate every statute which a
reviewing court believes could have been
drafted with greater precision. Many
statutes will have some inherent
vagueness, for in most English words and
phrases there lurk uncertainties.
Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 (1974).

Where the language of

the statute is in words of common understanding, even though
"marked by flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than
meticulous specificity," the statute will be upheld if it
"defines boundaries sufficiently distinct for citizens,
policemen, juries and appellate courts," Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112, 114 ( 1972), and is "sufficiently
clear and definite" for "persons of ordinary intelligence" to
understand its meaning.

Greaves, at 806.

The statute in this case could be no more clear than
it is already.

Persons of ordinary intelligence understand

what it is to be mentally ill, they are not required to guess
at the meaning of these words as suggested by appellant.
Furthermore, if this Court follows the legislative intent of
the statute, as demonstrated by the recent amendment, it must
find that the statute is not vague.

The statute was

interpreted by the trial court to include factors of
dangerousness and the need for future treatment just as the
legislature intended.

Section 77-14-5 is, therefore, not

rendered void due to excessive vagueness.
-21-
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C.

APPELLANT IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
INCARCERATED BECAUSE OF HIS STATUS.

Appellant claims that he is required to show that he
is permanently sane in order to be released and that there is
nothing more he can do to prove himself sane (see Appellant's
Brief, Point IV).

Therefore, to continue to confine him to

the Utah State Hospital is incarceration based on appellant's
status as "a sane person with schizophrenia, a mental illness
for which he bears no responsibility" (Appellant's Brief, p.
23).

Appellant misconstrues the purpose behind his
confinement to the hospital.

It is not for the purpose of

punishment that appellant is forced to remain there, but for
treatment of a disease he admittedly suffers.

The argument is

also contradictory in that it would appear to be impossible by
definition to be a sane person with a mental illness.
Appellant himself admits this by stating that:
[A] person is either restored to sanity or
not restored to sanity. A person is
either able to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct and conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law or he is not.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 18).
To support his position that he is incarcerated on

the basis of status, appellant cites Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962).

In that case, a drug addict was
-22-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

convicted and imprisoned under a statute making it a crime to
be a drug addict.

The United States Supreme Court held that

it was unconstitutional to punish a person merely.because he
was a drug addict.

The Court, however, distinguished between

punishment for status and confinement for treatment purposes.
The Court stated:
It is unlikely that any State at this
moment in history would attempt to make it
a criminal offense for a person to be
mentally il, or a leper, or to be
afflicted with a venereal disease. A
State might determine that the general
health and welfare require that the
victims of these and other human
afflictions be dealt with by compulsory
treatment, involving quarantine,
confinement, or sequestration.
Id. at 666.

It is a proper exercise of authority for this

state to determine that persons such as appellant are
dangerous to society and therefore that they must remain
confined so long as they suffer from mental illness.

TO be

released, a person need only show that he no longer suffers
from the particular mental illness for which he was confined.
Appellant can and should be released only when he can
demonstrate that he is free from this mental illness.

He need

not show that some other mental illness will never affect him
again: only that this mental illness will not.

Because he

cannot show that he is free from mental illness at this time
and be9ause he is confined for treatment rather than
punisnrnent purposes, appellant has not been incarcerated on
the basis of status.
-23-
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CONCLUSION
The application of S 77-14-5 to determine if
appellant had recovered from his mental illness does not meet
the definition of an ex post facto law and does not punish him
on the basis of status because the statute is not criminal in
nature.

The trial court properly applied that section and

properly defined it so as to include factors such as
dangerousness and possibility of relapse.

This is further

indicated by the fact that the legislature recently amended
the statute along those same lines.

Because this definition

could easily be reached by persons of ordinary intelligence,
the statute is not void for vagueness due to the lack of these
specific standards in the original version.

For these

reasons, the order of August 7, 1981 confining appellant to
the Utah State Hospital should be affirmed and his request for
release pursuant to former s 77-24-16 should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of May, 1983.
DAVID L. WILKINSON

AtiJ;;~
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
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